Room 8a
PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPIRE IN TIME OF WAR - SEDAN
The situation in central Europe after 1866 was considered by many observers at home and abroad to be transitional. In view of the growing domestic weakness and anti-Prussian stance of the French government, the Franco-Prussian relationship acquired an increasingly important role. As it did, Bismarck became more and more convinced that a conflict with France was unavoidable in the long run and that such a conflict simultaneously offered irrefutably advantageous opportunities for the completion of the unification process on his terms. However, the idea was to see that it occurred without outside intervention if possible and that its development remained controllable. The pretext arose when Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of a southern German Catholic branch of the Prussian royal house, became a candidate for the Spanish throne. After French protests caused the prince to withdraw his candidacy, the government of France tried to compound Prussia's diplomatic defeat by demanding guarantees against any future renewal of a Hohenzollern candidacy for the "throne of Charles V." Bismarck saw in this move a favorable opportunity to portray France as the aggressor. He rebuffed the government in Paris on 13 July 1870 with the provocative "Ems dispatch" (Emser Depesche), and the French began mobilizing against Prussia the next day. A formal declaration of war followed on 19 July.
In public opinion, Napoleon was the peacebreaker; in the international press, France was called the "oppressor in Europe" (as in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung on 17 July 1870). In the ensuing Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck, as chancellor of the North German Confederation, played a key role in the containment of the conflict and the simultaneous negotiations with the southern German states on the issue of unification.
Napoleon III had declared war without assuring himself of military support from Austria and Italy. To prevent a two-front war, Moltke had wanted to "avoid any appearance of aggression." After completing mobilization in accordance with the provisions of the military assistance pacts concluded in 1866-67 with the armies of the North German Confederation and the southern German states of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Württemberg, and Bavaria, Prussia commanded an infantry of 462,000 men and a cavalry of 56,800. It was opposed by a French army of approximately 336,000 men, a number that matched earlier calculations by the Prussian General Staff.
In Berlin and southern Germany patriotic fervor ran high, fed mainly by intense French agitation for war after the Hohenzollern prince had renounced his candidacy. Having declared war, Bismarck now sought to restrict it to France and the allied German states and was successful in ensuring the neutrality of Austria, Italy, England, Russia, and Denmark.
Many Germans saw the war as a "national necessity." This view was also expressed by the lawyer Justus von Ihering in a letter to Oskar von Bülow on 5 August:
How I thank God that I have lived to see this time. The rebirth of the German nation is at hand, and in the period of a few weeks it will make up for every sin it has committed in the course of a millennium. It is rising now as a united nation like Hercules in the cradle how different from the Italian [nation]! to crush the head of the serpent.
War fever did not remain confined to nationalist circles; it affected nearly all political groups and strata of the population in Germany, even Germans living abroad. This war thereby became the instrument for nationalist aspirations.
The triumphant military victory of Sedan on 2 September, the capitulation of one of the two main French armies, and the capture of the French emperor stunned the world and enhanced the prestige and popularity of the Prussian General Staff. The initial successes of the German armies and their rapid advance into France encouraged German expectations of victory. If at first the goal was to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible, all diplomatic and political activities were henceforth centered on containing the acts of war geographically. In the beginning, Bismarck had refrained from exerting influence on military leaders, but after Sedan, politics demanded due consideration. As he saw it, the military aspect of the war had already been decided. In his opinion, all that stood in the way of concluding peace was the imperial captive, Napoleon.
In the cottage of a weaver at Donchéry, Bismarck stated his conditions for the defeated emperor's capitulation: all weapons were to be laid down and the entire army was to be taken prisoner. His key question was: "Whose sword has Emperor Napoleon surrendered? France's or his own?" When the authorized French representative, Henri-Pierre-Abdon Castelnau, replied that it was only the sword of the emperor, it was clear that the war would have to continue. Above all, Bismarck insisted on "a material pledge to secure military results that have been obtained." At first, he considered the conditions of capitulation a "purely military issue" and left their arrangement to the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Helmuth von Moltke, and the French plenipoteniary, General Felix de Wimpffen. Wimpffen held out in vain for the withdrawal of the French Army with weapons, baggage, and flags to a part of France to be stipulated by Prussia or to Algeria. Moltke, however, demanded that all French troops become prisoners of war.
Because the Battle of Sedan had left no universally accepted partner with whom peace could be negotiated, a continuation of the war and a march on the capital seemed unavoidable to the Prussian military leaders. Moltke gave the corresponding orders on 2 September after Napoleon had already signed the capitulation. Bismarck criticized the decision of the army command and stressed later, too, that he had always considered the siege of the city a mistake. On 6 September, German headquarters in Reims received the news that the French imperial government had been overthrown in Paris. The empress had been driven from the throne, a provisional government had been formed by members of the former opposition, and a republic had been proclaimed. A bloodless revolution had in fact taken place on 4 September 1870, when a crowd of people stormed the Palais Bourbon, the seat of the Chamber of Deputies. In the city hall, members of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris had formed a "Government of National Defense," with Jules Favre taking over the foreign ministry and Léon Gambetta, the war and interior ministries. Bismarck's problem was with whom peace negotiations were to be conducted in the future.
Napoleon III had been brought as a prisoner of war to the Palace of Wilhelmshöhe near Kassel while 140,000 French soldiers in German camps awaited a decision. After Sedan, the French Army of the Rhine, whose 170,000 troops had been isolated in the fortress of Metz since 18 August, and the Metz Garrison were the only French units still intact, whereas the German army of occupation commanded by Prussian Prince Charles had grown to almost 200,000 men. Bismarck's aim was to cement the results of a war that had not yet ended. On 24 October a French council of war in Metz decided to surrender the Army of the Rhine, and the capitulation was signed on 27 October in accordance with the stipulations of Sedan. The entire Army of the Rhine passed into German captivity.
In view of the rapid German advance on Paris, the French foreign minister, Favre, decided to meet with Bismarck. On 19 and 20 September their encounter in the Rothschilds' chateau, Ferrieres, ushered in talks that were completed at the end of January 1871 with the armistice of Versailles. Because Favre was not prepared to cede any territory, no discussions of a preliminary peace came of these encounters. Bismarck did not want to agree to a cease fire based on the military status quo. Furthermore, German headquarters was counting on a quick military decision outside Paris. One of Bismarck's demands was the surrender of a key point in the Paris fortifications in return for a guarantee to supply the surrounded city with food and to restore communications between Paris and the provinces. Favre rejected these proposals. Announcement of the German demands heightened the patriotic mood in Paris into an indominable will to resist. Far from seeing itself as vanquished, the Paris government demanded an armistice and peace on its terms or a continuation of the war. The belligerents were still irreconcilable.
Although the supply problems under which Paris was suffering had steadily worsened since German troops had begun their siege of the capital, Bismarck's negotiations with Adolphe Thiers, the provisional government's "ambassador-at-large," collapsed in early November, thereby perpetuating the war. In addition, the temporary successes of the Army of the Loire at Coulmiers on 7 and 8 November had rekindled the fighting spirit of the French.
Beginning in mid-October, ministerial conferences with the southern German states were held in Versailles, opening the decisive phase of the struggle to shape the covenant that was to lead to the "German Empire." As a prelude, talks were opened with Bavarian mediators at headquarters in Reims, where Bismarck plainly stated his desire for a "unification of Germany into a federal state." Otherwise, the German Question would have to be settled without Bavaria in such a way that Baden, Hesse, and Württemberg would join the North German Confederation. If Bavaria were to show herself favorably disposed to the federal idea, Bismarck would consider granting King Louis special conditions.
German artillery commenced the bombardment of Paris at the end of December. Despite the fact that the war was still in progress, Bismarck pressed for a quick decision on the issue of national unity. On 18 January 1871, King William was proclaimed German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. After French units in the west, east, and, at last, in the north had been defeated in mid-January, Bismarck and Jules Favre resumed negotiations in private from 23 through 28 January. The capital surrendered and laid down its arms; the bombardment of Paris ceased. The Government of National Defense had to accept the occupation of several forts by the German army and the surrender of the Paris garrison. As a result of the peace preliminaries of 26 February, France had to cede Alsace and parts of Lorraine to Germany and pay a war indemnity of five billion francs. The domestic problems that led to revolt and the establishment of the Paris Commune on 18 March 1871 were not solved by the imposition of German occupation troops.
Marie-Louise von Plessen